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The physical sciences have long been regarded by 
scientists and philosophers alike as paradigms of 
perspicuity. Their theories are publicly identifiable, 
they exhibit a relatively distinct logic and method, 
and the relation between their theoretical and 
observational expressions, if not razor-sharp, is at 
least clear enough to survive the first assault of 
critical inspection. In contrast, it is often argued, 
the social and life sciences are rife with theoretical 
strife, their theories often so vague as to admit 
inconsistent interpretations, and their logic so 
embryonic as to require a private understanding. And, 
if these were not sufficient insult, it is widely 
believed that the most these sciences may encourage 
between their observational and theoretical aspects is 
an impolitic statistical acquaintance. Logic, Laws, 
and Life is a collection of contemporary essays which 
hope to forgive this knavery, and, if not thereby 
elevating the life and social sciences to sclentj fie 
knighthood, at least establishing them as respectable 
pages in the court of rationality. 
The contents of the anthology fall into three 
general categories, each dealing with a natural 
constellation of issues motivated by the errant 
sciences. The first three articles concern problems in 
statistical theory proper. The following three deal 
with the status of the life sciences vis-ä-vis the 
physical. And the last four are concerned with the 
nature of the social sciences. 
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The collection opens, appropriately, with a very 
readable sketch by L. J. Savage of the received task of 
statistical theory and its relation to the linguistic 
(necessarian), frequentist, and personalist 
(subjectivist) theories of probability. In the second 
article of the anthology, Ronald Giere forcefully shows 
that interpretations of probability do not completely 
determine statistical paradigms, although they may, as 
Savage argues, influence them. To account for the 
nature of work in statistical theory since the 1920's 
in particular, Giere finds it more fruitful to view 
those efforts as examples of "testing" and 
"information" models of statistical inference. On his 
view, in a "testing" model of inference the data 
involved are the output of a setup designed to test a 
particular hypothesis; the result of the process of 
testing is a dichotomous acceptance or rejection of the 
hypothesis. In contrast, the "information" model of 
inference produces a direct measure of the bearing of 
evidence on hypotheses; hypotheses are neither accepted 
nor rejected, but simply assigned changing weights as 
new evidence concerning them comes in. (I must say 
that in this and similar essays Giere has done much to 
clear the muck from the primary literature in 
statistics.) 
In the third article of the first set, "Consilience 
in Inductions and the Problem of Conceptual Change in 
Science," Robert Butts attempts to harmonize the 
competing strains of statistical modeling through 
Whewell's highly idiosyncratic theory of consilience. 
The essay is perhaps the most provincial of papers in 
this section in the sense that it presumes acquaintance 
with contemporary literature in the foundations of 
statistics. 
Michael Ruse's "Is Biology Different from Physics?" 
spiritedly introduces the second major topic of the 
collection: How are the physical and life sciences 
related? Ruse considers two classic issues relevant to 
this question: (a) whether, because of the complexity 
of biological phenomena, biological laws can hope to 
look like physical ones, and (b) whether teleological 
claims can be re-expressed in non-teleological form. 
Part of Ruse's approach to these problems is both 
charming and disarming. Let us take, he proposes, that 
part of biology most like physics, population genetics, 
and see whether it really behaves like a physical 
theory. If it does not, then the life and physical 
sciences must be truly distinct; but if the genetics 
looks like a physical theory, then at least some 
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sophistication will have been introduced into the old 
"reductionist" controversies. 
In an essay of somewhat narrower scope, "Teleology 
and Selective Processes," Peter Machamcr examines the 
question of whether in describing a selective process 
that operates on a biological entity we have provided 
sufficient grounds for talking about that entity in 
teleological terms. 
In the third and final essay of the "biology" 
section, Kenneth Schaffner provides a quite lucid 
taxonomy of the varieties of reductionist experience. 
His "Reduction, Reductionism, Values, and Progress in 
the Biomedical Sciences" should be read by anyone 
interested in the topic of reductionism in the life 
sciences—it does much to identify and organize the 
all-too-frequently muddied issues involved. 
The final section of the anthology opens with an 
article by Hadley Cantri1, who argues that psychology 
is intrinsically holistic, and thus, unlike physics, 
cannot ignore the relation of every part of experience 
to all others if it is to succeed as a science. This 
raises the old question, of course, of whether 
observation in psychology (or any of the other social 
sciences) can ever be theory-free. In the second 
article of this section, "Is Observation Theory-
laden?," Abner Shimony tries to show that at least N. 
R. Hanson's arguments in the affirmative cannot 
succeed. Robert Efion's remarks in the following 
"Biology Without Consciousness—and its Implication" 
try in turn to chart the problems involved in denying 
psychology the vocabulary of "consciousness." (The 
latter is perhaps the most impassioned—and least 
tightly argued—piece in the anthology; it is 
encouraging, however, to find a practicing scientist 
concerned about the philosophic respectability of his 
discipline.) The concluding article of the collection, 
"Psychology and Societal Facts," by Maurice Mandelbaum, 
waves a similar anti-reductionist banner, arguing that 
there are features of an adequate description of 
societal phenomena which cannot be handled by any 
theory of individual psychology. 
All in all, this book should be of interest to 
specialist and non-specialist alike, although someone 
wholly unfamiliar with the issues treated in the 
assemblage would do Well to read a good sketch of their 
taxonomy and dynamics in an introductory text,. 
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The "modern" posture of thinking is perhaps best 
exemplified in the attitudes assumed by Newtonian 
physics, Euclidean geometry, and Baconian science. At 
the heart of this posturing lies coiled an unquestioned 
fascination with absolute methodological certainty, 
pure objectivity, and the logical possibility of 
harnessing uncompromising control over the 
"environment" of study. In recent years, this style of 
thinking has come under increasingly intensive 
philosophical assault. At issue, of course, is the 
expression one should give to the "appropriate nature" 
of Human Reasoning. Dewey is clearly a fore-runner in 
this critical movement, but we must look to the work of 
Quine, Popper, Kuhn and Sellars (to mention but a few] 
to see the full range of momentum being generated 
against the modern thinkers. And yet, the excitement 
generated by their ideas has been undercut by a serious 
deficiency which, until the publication of Weimer's 
study on scientific methodology, did not promise 
fulfillment. I am referring to the lack of a radical 
alternative to modern posturing. "Post-modern" 
posturing, as we shall call it, simply has not come to 
expression in the writings of those thinkers at the 
"leading edges" of the "new" philosophy of science. 
This all changes, however, with the development of 
Weimer's position in his Notes on the Methodology of 
Scientific Research. Not only do we encounter a full-
bodied critique of modern posturing ior 
"justificational" thinking, as Weimer chooses most 
appropriately to call it], but we bear witness as well 
to a characterization and defense of the post-modern 
turn in Philosophy's attempts to give expression to the 
appropriate nature of scientific methodology. Not only 
are we led to see how justificational thinking 
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represents the prevailing "foundation" for our attempts 
to bring the methodological priorities of scientific 
research to expression, but we come to see as well the 
inherent limitations of the justificational posture. 
Granted, there is little if any novelty in Weimer*s 
characterization and defense of the post-modern turn 
away from justificational thinking, but his effort does 
represent a fine synoptic synthesis of the various ways 
of giving expression to this movement. And of course 
Weimer does not stop here, for out of his discussion of 
the inappropriateness of justificational thinking dawns 
a new frame-work— admittedly limited, but helpful just 
the same—upon which to hang a "non-justificational" 
style of thinking. In the process, we are led as 
readers to a new posturing with respect to such 
foundational notions as "rationality," "certainty," 
"truth," "objectivity," and "commitment." Weimer 1s 
principle intent is to re-situate these notions into a 
more appropriate context, and this involves re-thinking 
the very constitution of their meaning from the 
standpoint of the new orientation to posturing. And of 
course it is Weimer's contention that this context is 
none other than the context which engages human 
response, so that the new meanings become situated in a 
notion of Reason which can be subjected to "fine-
tuning" from the standpoint of life as we live if, not 
life as we think it. It is here that parallels begin 
to develop between the new philosophers of science and 
the so-called "Continental" thinkers, like Ortega, 
Heidegger, Sartre and others. In particular, Weimer's 
discussions of non-justificational thinking implicitly 
mirror the attitude toward Reason which has been 
developed in .the phenomenological thinking of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty. Obviously Weimer and Merleau-Ponty are 
not saying the same things from the same perspective. 
Rather, they are saying similar things from different 
perspectives, and thus it becomes our obligation to 
bring their respective attitudes under the umbrella of 
a single philosophical posturing. Even a modicum of 
success should merit appreciation for Weimer's 
efforts—especially from philosophers of science—for 
it will be principally because of his outline for a 
non-justificational alternative to modern posturing 
that the road to dialogue between two apparently 
divergent and uncomplimentary schools of thought is 
allowed to open out before us. Obviously we must 
discuss the developments which Weimer's approach brings 
to expression before going on to characterize the 
intriguing parallels which I have uncovered between his 
posture and Merleau-Ponty 1s. But we shall refrain from 
going into comprehensive detail, for I feel that the 
book is clearly written and carefully argued. 
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According to Weimer, previous efforts by the new 
philosophers of science have succeeded only in 
scratching the surface of the justificational posture. 
There has been no concerted effort to bring to 
expression the "essential unity of the metatheoretical 
position" which underlies justificational thinking in 
its essential unity as a style of posturing. This 
unity can be expressed in the form of a single Thought 
which guides the entire justificational project: 
"Truth exists, and can be harnessed—or at the very 
least, increasingly approximated—by means of 
justification [and only by means of justification]." 
Implicit in this Thought is a characterization of Truth 
as something "separate" from Man, for the 
justificationist needs an unbiased notion of Truth; and 
this means that "Truth" as a notion cannot be rooted in 
"human projecting." And of course it becomes 
imperative that we have this unbiased notion to ground 
the methodological tools of "prediction" and 
"probability inference" which most philosophers of 
science find absolutely essential to scientific 
activity. Science, after all, is looked upon as 
"method," as indeed it should be looked upon. But 
justificationists see this method as lacking the firm 
footing necessary for the generation of Knowledge. For 
scientific method to be recognized as a "legitimate 
source" of Knowledge, it must first be justified. How 
else can we be sure that the method is infallible! 
Now, it becomes instantly clear that we can only 
justify method if we have access to a supreme 
epistemological authority, and thus the first job of 
the justificationist is to uncover the essential nature 
of this authority. But regardless of whether you 
choose the "intellect" or the "deliverances of sense," 
you are aiming at one thing only: a justification of 
scientific method, so as to secure the epistemological 
ground for pursuing Truth. 
The motivation behind the posture of 
justificational thinking lies in the project of ridding 
the world once and for all of the anarchy of relativism 
and the vicious spectre of irrationalism. If it can be 
shown that the rational way of life is justifiably 
best, and that Reason's "calling" is nothing short of 
the "march toward lasting autonomy," then it is also 
possible to see the efforts of science as a cumulative 
march toward ultimate convergence with Truth. Now, 
clearly we must view science as "empirical," since we 
want to say that it looks at real things, real 
situations, and explains the essential nature of the 
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Real. So, again, we need to give expression to the 
foundational authority, which will ground our access to 
things now, in addition to Truth. Thus our uncovering 
of that supreme epistemological authority would rid us 
not only of relativism and the spectre of 
irrationalism, but equally well of two questions which, 
it is interesting to note, have plagued Philosophy 
since the first advances of justificational posturing: 
we would need to ask neither how it is that we know 
things, nor how it is that knowledge claims can be 
justified, and the business of science would be freed 
once and for all from the barbs of post-modern 
criticism. We would set off in search of ever-more 
"factually relevant" input, and recognize an ever-
growing plenitude of truths to be the manifestation of 
our increasing approximation of the Truth. But of 
course, as we might well suspect, there is a bit of a 
problem. How do we ever justify our ultimate Thought, 
by which the entire is given its guidance? How do we 
justify the fact that there is a Truth which is somehow 
accessible by means of justificational approximations? 
"Well, you have to begin somewhere, don't you?" Yes, 
indeed. But must we begin with a Thought? And, more 
specifically, with a Thought of Man as a projection 
toward the Absolute? Justificationists begin with this 
Thought because it is the only way they can pioceed. 
Without this Idea, there is no justificational project. 
But does this mean also that there is no legitimate 
pursuit of Truth, either? Well, if we are to speak of 
a pursuit of "Truth," then we are going to need the 
justificational posture. But if we abstain from a 
concrete "positing" of truth as a something-in-
particular-toward-which-we-project-ourselves, then we 
might well be able to speak of truth within a non-
jus tificational framework. We might, in other words, 
be able to speak of truth without also needing to 
postulate the human being's projection toward the 
Absolute. Furthermore, it might once and for all 
become clear to us that the "vicious spectre" of 
relativism is a product of the justificational project, 
and that it dissolves without effort the moment we 
reject the "modern" posture. First, however, we must 
see that the justificationist has no choice but to 
retreat in an irrational manner to the commitment he 
has to his supreme Thought. It is really quite simple, 
and has been a recognized argument for some time: once 
you attempt to justify the activity of justification, 
you have no choice but to invoke the authority you are 
attempting to justify. The enforming Thought which 
guides the justificational project simply cannot be 
justified. One can only commit to its authority by an 
irrational leap of faith. Is this not reason enough to 
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question the integrity of justificational presumptions? 
Weimer could easily stop here, but he chooses instead 
to pursue the matter from within the justificational 
posture, to show how internally generated fallout from 
the position brings justificational thinking to the 
utter brink of skepticism. 
He begins this "internal" criticism of the 
"received" view with a discussion of "factual 
relativity." His intent is to show, in effect, how 
Kantian Idealism offers justificational thinking the 
supreme epistemological authority it so desperately 
needs at the expense of the supreme end toward which it 
fancies itself projected. The point is quite simple, 
though hardly as easy to defend: "facts" are always 
situated within the confines of that perspective one 
assumes with respect to the study of facts. If it is 
indeed true that facts do not partake in neutrality, 
then clearly our horizon of expectations will come to 
have a direct impact on how we go about giving 
expression to the fact's presence. Without giving us 
any convincing reasons for accepting this "fact" about 
facts, Weimer proceeds to draw the ultimate Idealistic 
conclusion. Facts, by which he means the "references" 
of the "empirical terms" of science, simply "cannot be 
given in our acquaintance" since they are, rather, 
"idealized, i.e., constructed, by our conceptual 
schemes." Facts, then, are, by the inherent nature of 
their constitution, necessarily relative to conceptual 
points of view. But does this not take away the 
"empirical ties" necessary for science to investigate 
and explain the play of forces we call Reality? 
"Conventionalism," the last retreat of justificational 
thinking before the evidence of factual relativity, 
accepts this revelation without looking upon it as 
problematic. "The given in experience, as a 'neutral' 
or independent foundation for knowledge, as a 'basis' 
of firm and invariant facts, is a myth." So clearly, 
we have to recognize that a 
theory is not informative knowledge but 
[merely] our way of looking at particular 
facts, our way of classifying particular 
observed facts. 
Theoretical science thus becomes nothing more than "an 
empty structure to store information in, a way of 
saying things, a language." Furthermore, "nothing in 
reality strictly corresponds to [the] abstract or 
imagined theoretical concepts." But this really does 
not prove to be a problem. After all, we may not have 
a science that engages "reality," but at least our 
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science has a Thought of the real. And by means of 
this Thought, it is able to postulate the Ideal toward 
which human reason should endeavor to project itself. 
The Ideal environment, the Ideal genetic make-up, the 
Ideal artificial equilibrium within which the Ideal 
Human would be situated. All of this we feel justified 
in striving after, simply because of our retreat to a 
commitment in an ability to justificationally 
approximate an unbiased Truth. You see, it may be true 
that empirical science cannot be grounded in an 
absolute fashion, but this is not really the type of 
science we need. We need a scientific methodology that 
operates on the basis of our Thought of reality. And 
this Thought of reality is really, we come finally to 
see, no more than a logical extension of the initial 
enforming Idea by which justificational thinking is 
given its orientational bearings. 
We must remember that the issue is not scientific 
methodology, but the expression we come to give of the 
appropriate nature of scientific methodology. And thus 
it clearly makes sense to ask whether science is really 
so detached from experience as the justificationist 
must ultimately argue, or whether it is not rather 
directly engaged with—and indeed, even inserted 
within—the stream of experiential unfolding itself. 
Clearly Weimer is of the strong opinion that the 
unflinching justificational drive to provide science 
with an absolute foundation has "removed" us from 
genuine contact with the scientific enterprise. But he 
lias failed, in my opinion, to provide his reader with 
convincing reasons for sharing in this opinion. We may 
feel extreme sympathy for his position, but we cannot, 
on the basis of his presentation, give reasons why 
Conventionalism, say, has not really captured the 
essentiality of appropriate scientific methodology. As 
I will argue later, one must turn to the writings of 
someone Like Merleau-Ponty, before anything like an 
"ontological" argument surfaces against the 
justificational style of thinking. Nonetheless, Weimer 
is quite helpful, for he has given us a rather clear 
picture of what justificational posturing amounts to. 
We are essentially brought to the point where we would, 
if we could but harness the necessary ontological 
vision, see clearly why justificational thinking is, at 
best, self-stultifying. And of course Weimer continues 
his study as though we had as readers actually been 
given over to such a vision. The result is the 
uncovering of some essential dimensions of non-
justificational posturing, and, most appropriately, a 
notion of Reason which the human being can actually 
live up to. 
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II 
Karl Popper has written that "the empirical basis 
of objective science has . . . nothing 'absolute' about 
it." There is, he says, "nothing rock-bottom" upon 
which to rest scientific methodology. Speaking in 
language quite reminiscent of the later Wittgenstein, 
Popper adds that 
when we cease our attempts to drive our piles 
into a deeper layer, it is not because we have 
reached firm ground. We simply stop when we 
are satisfied that they are firm enough to 
carry cthe structure, at least for the time 
being. 
Thus empirical knowledge must be seen to be rational, 
"not because it has a foundation, but because it is a 
self-correcting enterprise which can^put any claim in 
jeopardy, though not all at once." Only a non-
justificational style of thinking can give expression 
to this facet of scientific methodology. From the 
standpoint of non-justificational posturing, "nothing 
is conclusively 'established' or 'refuted'," simply 
because the "aim of justifying a scientific proposition 
has been abandoned." Knowledge is no longer equated 
with proof. Rather, we come to speak of "warranted 
assertions," the activity of proof giving way to the 
activity of "marshaling enough good reasons" in the 
assertions behalf to allow for commitment to the claims 
of the assertion. And this means that rationality 
ceases to be located in justification, becoming 
situated instead within the realm of criticism. And 
here the point seems to be the claim that Questioning 
should take "precedence" over Presumption. Not that we 
become constantly critical, for then we would have no 
room for commitment. But we are critical enough that 
there is no room for absolute commitment [which, of 
course, can only be "reached" by an irrational leap of 
faith]. There is, then, no "retreat" to commitment, 
for the "principle" of infallibility becomes a supreme 
ontological principle. Nothing is immune to criticism. 
What we have in place of absolute commitment is 
"commitment simpliciter," where one retains "both the 
courage of his convictions and the courage to go on 
attacking his convictions." This attitudinal posture 
is only possible by means of a dialogue between 
criticism and commitment, a dialogue which shows forth 
as a kind of monitoring. But no longer do we speak of 
assessment in terms of an invariant goal/truth, and 
thus our "picture" of where we want to go (in terms of 
which we take our current bearings) cannot be a picture 
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so much as a feeling. For the goal/truth we assess in 
terms of is an operative goal/truth. The dialogue 
between criticism and commitment thus amounts to a 
testing out and playing around inside some particular 
guiding thought which is expressed initially not as an 
Ideal toward which 1 project my conscious desires and 
aspirations, but simply as a feeling. From the moment 
an enforming operative goal/truth cries out from within 
for expression I am the project of bringing a feeling 
to conceptual articulation through the successive 
refinements of active expression. Thus the "search" 
for Truth never really leaves the horizon mapped out by 
the operative goal. And the operative goal is what I 
am the activity of bringing to articulation. But I am 
not "progressing toward" the truth, so much as 
participating in the truth. In this way, then, it can 
be said that truth indeed has its roots in the essence 
of human projecting, and that we must therefore come to 
see the appropriate way to look upon notions like 
"truth," "objectivity," and "certainty." They are no 
longer appropriately viewed as "absolute" notions-
notions that would somehow be what they are apart from 
the human taking of perspective—but rather, they must 
be viewed as "operative" notions, and, furthermore, as 
notions which have been given expression by humans to 
articulate a certain underpinning of stability which we 
experience in our lives. Modern posturing presumed 
that this stability was somehow a product of Absolute 
Foundation which, if given proper expression, would 
justify our endeavor to partake in Reason's march 
toward lasting autonomy. But the non-justificationist 
cannot resort to such an absolute commitment. He must 
look for our underpinning of stability within the 
operative dimensions of our projective being. Weimer 
comes close to this recognition when he writes that 
"scientific life (its inferences)" are guided by "the 
way scientists form concepts." And scientists form 
their concepts no differently than the so-called 
creatures of ordinary reason. "A correct 
characterization of the nature of scientific knowledge 
is also a correct characterization of knowledge, 
simpliciter" (Weimer, p. 69). Thus the key to 
unlocking the door to appropriate expression of 
scientific methodology lies in our coming to 
"understand how human beings generate their concepts." 
"Put another way," Weimer writes, "the nature of 
knowledge acquisition does not change with the change 
from common sense to science; it is only the end 
products that change." Unfortunately, Weimer stops 
short of an active attempt to work for the harnessing 
ot such an understanding, choosing instead to refer 
briefly to Polanyi's notion of "tacit" knowledge. His 
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point is to suggest that "unspoken" knowledge takes 
over the role of "guidance" from the justificational 
unattainables posited by modern thinking. But he also 
endeavors to show that the mere fact that tacit 
knowledge guides our activities shows how our explicit 
knowledge must represent a biased transformation of 
meaning. Quoting from the physicist David Böhm, Weimer 
brings his reader to the brink of the understanding we 
seek regarding the generation of human concepts: 
Theories are changing all the time [writes 
BöhmJ; . . . each new step may introduce 
something novel and incommensurable with what 
came before. Indeed, even to read an article 
and to understand it is, in general, to change 
it significantly. For understanding something 
is assimilation . . . a kind of perception. 
As Merleau-Ponty says, conceptual articulation is 
grounded in perceptual figuring. It is because we are 
first and foremost perspective [and not the taking of a 
perspective] that our thinking cannot be given 
appropriate guidance by the simple positing of 
absolutes. Our expression of appropriate scientific 
methodology must take its principal bearings from the 
brute given of perceptual ambiguity. We are 
perspective; thus, we are a way of seeing, and, quite 
simultaneously, countless other ways of not seeing. 
And we are this way of seeing as an operative 
goal/truth which focuses us in tune with a certain 
directionality, but only at the expense of other ways 
of being attuned. Thus we are always situated with 
respect to the prevailing "projection" we exist, and 
can, therefore, see no more than our perspective 
allows. We are an opening-onto-the-world which engages 
profiles. And these profiles, these shadings, are the 
things of the world insofar as they have been 
articulated. We thus never have a thing in its 
unadulterated entirety, and thus a scientist does not 
either. But then scientists have, by and large, known 
this for some time, thanks in large part to 
Heisenberg 1s discovery of the uncertainty principle. 
We can measure the speed of a particle or its location, 
but not both simultaneously. Thus we decide, in the 
words of Heisenberg, "by our selection of the type of 
observation employed, which aspects of nature.are to be 
determined and which are to be blurred." Weimer 
refers to the economic theorizing of F. A. Hayek to 
bring the force of Heisenberg's discovery into the 
realm of everyday life. According to Hayek, perception 
is a seeing-as, and one can only see something "as," 
say, an event if the seeing is enformed by "an 
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organism's preexisting natural kind classifications.""' 
One simply cannot "see" an "event" at all, unless the 
event "is assimilated to a classification that already 
exists in the functioning" of the body-perspective. 
And this places a distinct limitation on our ability to 
"know" tilings. We can only know things as they show 
themselves to our bodily projection, and our projection 
is always perspectival, always focused in a distinct 
way that allows for no more than the generation and 
engagement of profiles. This is a major ontological 
position within the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, and 
more than Hayek or Weimer or anyone else in the domain 
of post-modern philosophical attitudes toward 
appropriate scientific methodology, Merleau-Ponty^shows 
why we are perspectives opening onto the world. ' And 
to show this is to show as well that human meaning is a 
product of perceptual figuring, that it necessarily 
harbors at the core of its genesis an essential 
dimension of ambiguity. This becomes an extremely 
important point to bear in mind in relation to the 
study of complex systems. If one is true to 
perception, if one recognizes the fundamental 
limitations of human thinking, then it becomes quite 
clear that "we should not be able fully to shape human 
affairs according to our wishes." Justificational 
thinkers have long believed 
that by the full use of his reason man could 
make himself fully master of his fate. It 
seems, however, that this desire to make 
everything subject to rational control, far 
from achieving the maximal use of reason, is 
rather an abuse of reason- based upon a 
misconception of its powers. 
Thus the non-justificationist is really condemning the 
justificationist for his greatest achievement, namely, 
the ability to "abstract" from ambiguity to the clarify 
of pure calculative thinking. The justificationist is 
able to ignore the ambiguity, or perhaps able even to 
cover it up behind a wealth of statistics and 
mathematical formulae, because he is operating not with 
the thing given in experience, but with the thing given 
in Thought. But to operate on the basis of a Thought-
of-thTng constiutes an abuse of reason. It is not as 
if Reason could somehow work"~^hard enough" to overcome 
the ambiguity. Rather, it is impossible to completely 
remove ambiguity, for ambiguity is an integral part of 
our very experiential unfolding. It is harbored in the 
very upsurge of meaning. And thus we have no choice 
but to confront the ambiguous, for the situations 
enworlding us and the contexts within which we operate 
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will harbor essential dimensions of ambiguity simply 
because we must orient ourselves in perspectival 
fashion. Would it not seem appropriate, then, to style 
our Thinking from the standpoint of a special 
sensitivity to the brute fact of ambiguity? The non-
jus tificationist would be, on Weimer's account, 
operating with just such a sensitivity, as the dialogue 
between criticism and commitment makes clear. But what 
Weimer fails to make clear is the nature of the 
"ontological 'why?'" which Merleau-Ponty's philosophy 
strives to bring to expression. Both Weimer and 
Merleau-Ponty are critical of the justificational 
posture for attempting to "found the existing world 
upon thought of the world." The justificationist sets 
out, on the basis of this thought, to look upon the 
Real as a "correlate" of thought, the actual becoming 
quite literally "exactly what we think we s e e — 
cogitatum or noema." This, of course, is the idealism 
of Conventionalism, and the activity of its thought-
process amounts to nothing less than the endeavor to 
uncover some kind of "cognitive adequation" between 
ourselves and the world. Given the primacy of the 
justificationist's Thought-of-Reality, it is no 
surprise that our thinking has traditionally projected 
itself toward a "correcting" of the characterization we 
give to the world, until the world itself comes into 
literal conformance with the Rational Idea we hold 
supreme. Clearly this is Hegelian thinking. But it is 
thinking at work in the world today, as well, for the 
world engaged by justificationists is nothing short of 
a Husserlian "Noema" which serves as the presumptive 
Ground against which we "figure" our cultural and 
technological innovations. The justificationist, then, 
operates upon the basis of a Thought, but his responses 
to problems which have been defined within the context 
of his guiding Thought are injected into the very flesh 
of the world within which we live. Obviously this 
could become an extremely hazardous practice if the 
justificational posture represents an abuse of reason. 
Instead of postulating an absolute spectator who 
strives incessantly after cognitive adequation between 
self and world, we must speak of the situated 
perspective which we are first and foremost, and which 
is in perpetual dialogue with its environment. The 
need, then, would seem to be for a non-justificational 
style of thinking. Such a style of thinking would be 
responsive to the demands of human involvement, 
responsive as well to feedback, but no longer for the 
justificational purpose of "keeping on target" toward 
some pre-fixed, pre-arranged rendezvous point. 
Instead, the responsiveness to feedback would be guided 
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by a desire to evaluate the status of an operative 
goal/truth which is still in the process of being 
refined. It would be a style of thinking which poses 
questions that are essentially aimed at assessment and 
interrogation of prevailing procedures, environmental 
signals and goal-refinement, rather than questions 
which are essentially goal-reinforcing. . There would be 
no presumptions of completeness, though nevertheless 
one would, after a time of planning, have to "go on" 
and take that first step. But one's method of 
proceeding would strive to enforce options rather than 
some presumptive linear progression toward the absolute 
approximation of a pre-fixed goal. And always the 
underlying question—the critical dimension of the 
dialogue between criticism and commitment--would be an 
interrogation which aims to remain faithful to the fact 
that while we are, as perspectives, "openness-onto-tlie-
world," there is an equally present "occulafion," or 
unrevealedness, of the world which must not be excluded 
from the domain figured by the operative style of 
thinking. Non-justificational thinking, therefore, 
does not operate on the presumption of absolute clarity 
and the corresponding illusion of potentially 
harnessable absolute control. Instead, it posits as 
ontologically primary the "compossibility" of presence 
and ambiguity. And this demands, quite literally, a 
new style of thinking. Notions like "objectivity," 
"truth," "commitment," and "clarity" would take on 
entirely new dimensions. No longer would these notions 
be situated within a framework defined by the human 
ability to conceptually abstract on the basis of a 
guiding Thought-of-Reality. Instead, these terms would 
take on an operative dimension, becoming situated as 
notions within the framework for thinking which is 
silently constructed out of the perceptual dialogue we 
exist with the-world-onto-which-we-open-as-perspective. 
It is my feeling that Weimer has opened up new horizons 
which future post-modern philosophers of science will 
be able to situate themselves within as t,hey work to 
bring to expression a non-justJficational 
characterization of appropriate scientific methodology. 
But it is also my opinion that Weimer's framework is 
not, in itself, enough. Thus these post-modern 
thinkers will need to turn elsewhere for inspiration, 
and it has been the purpose of this study to give 
reason for turning to the work of Merleau-Ponty. 
Clearly such a suggestion could not have been made 
prior to the publication of Weimer's book, and thus we 
owe a debt of gratitude to his efforts, as well as a 
careful reading of his text. The book is really quite 
excellent, and students of the various specific 
philosophical attitudes toward scientific methodology 
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will find Weimer's comprehensive appendix especially 
rewarding. I have chosen to isolate the focus of my 
discussion of Notes on the Methodology of Scientific 
Research on the theoretical foundations being set out 
Tiü the first half of his presentation. But the 
appendix-half of the book offers the reader a clear 
examination of how specific "problems" in the 
philosophy of science are influenced or completely re-
thought from the standpoint of the theoretical 
framework Weimer offers for a non-justificational style 
of thinking, and is, thus, not to be ignored. 
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